

INTELLIFAX 19

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY China

DATE DISTR. 19 MAY 50

SUBJECT The Young China Party

NO. OF PAGES 5

PLACE
ACQUIRED

25X1C

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF INFO.

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

25X1X

1. The Young China Party (YCP) is one of several relic parties now centered in Hong Kong which, although throughout its history it has opposed the Kuomintang, has not joined the Chinese Communists in the new government. The YCP was founded in Europe about 1923. Its principal founders were LI Huang (李璜), YU Chia-chu (余家菊), TSENG Ch'i (曾琦) and HO Lu-chih (何魯之). The main principles of the party were, and are, democracy and nationalism.
2. The YCP originally opposed the Kuomintang on the grounds of Nationalism, specifically objecting to the pre-1928 inclusion of Communists in the Kuomintang and later objecting to Japanese influence in it. Thus, parenthetically, the YCP has the longest anti-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) record of any political group in China. The struggle between the Kuomintang and the YCP was continual from 1923 until 1939. During this period the YCP underwent relentless persecution, but it recruited a considerable membership in academic circles.
3. The YCP was active in promoting guerrilla activities in Manchuria after the Japanese occupation, and supported the 19th Route Army in the Shanghai battles of 1931-32. After 1932 most of its leaders took refuge in Szechuan, where they were protected by the warlords there, mainly LIU Hsiang and LIU Wen-hui. Here they published their own newspaper, organized guerrilla operations and based underground political work in all parts of China. They were particularly active in universities, where they enrolled many students and professors. Many of these were from Southeast Asia, where they now reside.
4. The YCP's political influence was greatly nullified by the Kuomintang after the end of the Pacific War, when the greater part of the YCP, led by TSENG Ch'i, TSO Ch'uan-sheng and CH'EN Chi-t'ien (陳啟天), accepted the offer of the Kuomintang to cooperate in joining a multiparty government. A considerable faction of the party, led by LI Huang and HO Lu-chih, refused to cooperate. This development cost the YCP considerable support, but the leaders who favored cooperation were convinced by Premier CHANG Ch'ün, who had been one of the YCP's supporters during its Szechuan days, that they could play a necessary, reforming role in the government.
5. During 1947 and 1948 the cooperating faction of the YCP was active in

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NSR	DISTRIBUTION									
ARMY		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FBI										

Document No. 7
 No Change in Class. ☐
☐ Declassified
 Class. Changed To: TS S (C)
 Auth: HR 70-2
 DATE 8-10-87 BY R004900100097-4
 BY: 0227

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

25X1A

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 2 -

the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, where they consistently backed LI Tsung-jen and opposed CHIANG Kai-shek and the CC Clique. However, they were attacked by the balance of the Party as being too close to the Kuomintang. Of the cooperating faction, TSUNG Ch'i is in America, and TSO Ch'uan-sheng and CH'EN Chi-tien are on Taiwan, working closely with the Kuomintang. LI Huang is in Hong Kong, attempting to make an accommodation with the Communists through the instrumentality of CHANG Ian, Chairman of the Democratic League and YANG Shu-ming (楊叔明). HO Lu-chih is in Hong Kong, trying to restore at least some part of the YCP's former independence.

6. The YCP has always concentrated on building up its membership in educational circles, local gentry (including schoolmasters, district and sub-district chiefs and local militia leaders), small landlords and younger and junior army officers. It had about 3,000 registered members in the latter group in 1938. Many of these were retired at the end of the Pacific War, when CH'EN Ch'eng dismissed many officers not personally attached to him. All of these younger officers had been recruited and indoctrinated by the YCP and sent by the YCP to various military academies such as the Yunnan Provincial Military College (about 250), Ginling (Nanking) Military School (about 350), Northeastern Military College (about 1,200), Hangchow Revenue Guards Training School (about 300) and the Szechuan Military Training School and 21st Army Officers' Training School (about 800).
7. Centers where the YCP still exercises considerable influence through resident membership of persons with military backgrounds are:
 - a. Szechuan -- the Lei-na-P'ing-o (雷馬屏峨) area, the northern boundary of Szechuan, where the North Szechuan Mountain Defense Corps (Ch'uan Pei Shan Fang-wei Tui 川北山防衛隊) is an old YCP military formation, and the following hsien: Chungking, Hsin tu, Fu shun, Jen shou, Chiang chin, Nan pu, Chien yang and Kuan. Here the YCP has worked with and has contacts with the Ke-lao-Hui.
 - b. Honan -- Wanhsi hsien.
 - c. Sikang Province -- Lushan and T'ienchuan hsien.
 - d. Kwangtung Province -- Lienshan and East River areas.
 - e. Kiangsu and Chekiang Provinces -- T'aihu, Hsuhai and Lungch'uan areas.
 - f. Anhui Province -- Tapihshan, especially in the vicinity of Lihuang, and Tangtu hsien.
 - g. Northeastern Provinces -- Scattered influence mainly coming from remnants of the extensive, successful anti-Japanese guerrilla operations led by YCP members MIAC K'o-hsiu (苗可秀) and TENG T'ieh-wei (鄧鐵薇).
 - h. Shantung Province -- Scattered influence from former YCP anti-Japanese volunteers.
 - i. Shensi Province -- Scattered influence from former military subordinates of YEN Hsi-shan.
8. Centers in Southeast Asia where the YCP is influential in the local Chinese community by reason of its membership among educators and among alumni of Chinese universities are: Manila, Hanoi, Saigon, Jakarta and Singapore.
9. YCP leaders in Hong Kong are in regular contact with some members in China

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~ **CONFIDENTIAL**

25X1A

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 3 -

proper and in Southeast Asia, and in occasional and irregular contact with many others.

10. For the present, the Hong Kong activities of the YCP are under the control of HSIEH Ch'eng-p'ing (謝澄平) and HO Lu-chih. The greater part of the efforts of the Hong Kong leaders go toward the publication of their magazine, the Independent Front (Tzu-yu Ch'ien-hsien 自由前線). Its total circulation is in the neighborhood of 3,000 and its total paid circulation is in the neighborhood of 2,500. The magazine retails at HK\$0.40, of which the distributor retains about HK\$0.30. The ten cents received by the publishers do not cover printing costs. All articles are contributed, no payment being made. Shipments of the magazine to Southeast Asia are handled by a commercial agency which takes all of the copies it can get.
11. In addition to this publishing enterprise, the Hong Kong leaders are occupied in consultation with other YCP members, political liberals without specific party affiliation, anti-CC Clique Kuomintang members, Kwangsi Clique members and similar persons resident in Hong Kong. Their aim in so doing is to attempt to restore the earlier anti-CCP, anti-Kuomintang position of the leadership of the YCP.
12. The apathy of the average political refugee in Hong Kong, engendered by recent developments in China, is not shared by leaders of the YCP, who feel that they must continue to strive for the realization of their political ideals. A draft of a program for their activities, prepared for their own guidance, follows:

How to Save Democracy in China

"After having heard the statement 'U.S. will not give up China,' and after separately and collectively careful considerations among ourselves, we must boldly advance the following proposals.

"A. A Research Institute* will be established with the functions:

- "(1) to enlighten and to foster the fundamental and true ideals of Democracy.
- "(2) to study the various phases of political theories and to dig out their truth and fallacy - especially of Communism.
- "(3) to prepare to educate the general masses of the public in true Democracy.
- "(4) to plan and to formulate the policy of China's Reliberation Movement.
- "(5) to cultivate and to select personnel to direct the above movement.
- "(6) to supervise the underground movement.
- "(7) it is an elastic organization which is able to house all elderly Democratic Liberal elements to form a United Front.

"B. An United Democratic Committee** will be formed:

- "(1) to unite all the progressive liberal elements who are neither pro-Communist nor reactionary.
- "(2) to execute the policy formulated by the Research Institute.
- "(3) to help and to push the underground movement on the Continent.

The Research Institute is like a combined general staff and the United Democratic Committee like a general headquarters of an army.

"C. Information Organizations: Various Information Organizations in the form of Radio Stations, Newspaper Publications and various other pamphlets and periodicals especially in Chinese will be established to tell the Chinese general public the truth and not to be misled by twisted propaganda.

"D. Democratic educational institutions in the Communist territory such

~~SECRET~~**CONFIDENTIAL**

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25X1A

- 4 -

as missionary schools must be efficiently and carefully used as the places to teach Democracy:

"(1) The student's burden will be minimized so that it can be reached by all common people.

"(2) Scholarships will be liberally and generously awarded so that it will increase the enrollment.

"E. To help the 'refugees' to escape from the Communist bondage and to fortify the belief and to strengthen the position of those who have escaped.

"F. To keep contact with political liberals and military leaders who surrendered to the Communist Government by passive means.

"G. To awake the general mass of the people in the Communist territory, even Communists themselves, to the hidden imperialism behind international Communism."

13. The Hong Kong leaders of the YCP have been considering possibilities for leadership of a third party movement. Of first consideration is LI Tsung-jen. LI, however, lacks many of the qualifications of a popular leader. When LI was elected Vice President, it resulted from a great popular demand for new leadership, change and reform. Many of the delegates who voted for LI did so in defiance of instructions from party leaders to support other candidates. LI, however, never responded to this popular demand. He always assessed the political situation in terms of clique relationships, and he was always so fearful of the CHIANG that he hesitated to act positively and independently. Thus, much of his following dropped away. LI has a very limited imagination, and he is very badly advised by those closest to him, who are individuals without much knowledge or understanding of any problems not relating specifically to Kwangsi Province.
14. There is little hope for finding effective anti-Communist leadership among the chiefs of the non-Communist parties presently a part of the coalition Government. These individuals have been thoroughly trapped by the CCP and they have no opportunity for independent political action. They are attempting to organize and work against the Communists on a covert basis, but unless there is a serious split of some kind in the CCP it is hard to see how they can gain any independence by these means.
15. No one of the anti-Kuomintang and anti-CCP political personages outside of China proper has a significantly large following or qualities of leadership, although many of these individuals have excellent political reputations and small followings on whom they can count. Carson CHANG is regarded as theoretical and impractical and shows little interest in the practical problems which must be met if any anti-Communist movement is to succeed. KU Feng-yu, in common with almost all the other intellectuals in this group, has too much of a theoretical bias and is much too cautious.
16. Only two of the businessmen who might be placed in this category have ever given any indication of interest in leading, or participating, in any important way, in an anti-Communist political movement. These are K.F. CH'EN and Y. T. NIAO. CH'EN, however, is also an over-cautious individual. He would rather affiliate himself with such a movement than attempt to lead it in any very positive way. NIAO is overly concerned with his personal fortune, and his close ties with LUNG Yun make him suspect.
17. Perhaps the most active person in this category is General SUN Hsiang-kang, who is attempting to promote his own party, and to get support for it. SUN is generally mistrusted by the other anti-Kuomintang, anti-Communist liberals by reason of his past record. He was once expelled from the Young China Party for revealing party secrets to the Japanese police. Carson CHANG expelled him from the Democratic Socialist Party for unknown reasons, probably for a breach of party discipline. Also, SUN has close associations with the Whampoa Clique, and through them with CHIANG Kai-shek.***

* [REDACTED] Comment. The "Research Institute" mentioned in the plans

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET~~

25X1A

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 5 -

needs some elucidation. This is a device commonly employed in Chinese politics. It will, for example, be recalled that LI Chi-shen and TSAI Ting-k'ai had such an institution during the period of their exile in Hong Kong. The research institute serves many purposes. Propaganda-wise, it is a center for the formulation and expression of the theoretical position of the group controlling it. The importance of this sort of activity is generally underestimated by Western observers, who do not realize that what appears to them as empty, turgid and rhetorical political theorizing usually has a tremendous appeal to the Chinese intellectuals to whom it is addressed, and that such persons are not wont to act politically without a theoretical position on which to base their acts. Also, the research institute serves as a means for training and indoctrinating political workers, again a procedure more necessary and more important in China than in the West. The institute also serves as a means to support party elders, giving them something to do and paying them moderately to do it. Such individuals, if they are at all well known, inevitably attract paying students. Some of the latter come of their own accord, and others whose families are members of the party running the institute are sent to study there. Finally, the student body of the institute serves as a reservoir for party workers, indoctrinated students used in party activities in accordance with their capacities, or sent elsewhere for training. It might be added that the institute always publishes the writings of its faculty members, and so serves as an organ for the propaganda position of the controlling party.

25X1A

Comment. The "united democratic committee" mentioned in the plan refers to efforts to associate the YCP with the Democratic Socialists and with other anti-CHIANC and anti-Communist groups, so as to repair some of the damage to the prestige of the YCP occasioned by the developments mentioned in paragraph 4.

25X1A

Comment. It is becoming apparent that the YCP, lacking a single leader, is attempting to gather a number of these individuals with small followings and some status in Chinese politics into some formal organization. Behind this front the present leadership in Hong Kong would like to consider itself a more powerful source which is to provide the implementation, the drive, for the movement.

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~